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Appendix 3

CIA's Need for Photo-Intelligence

1. During the past two weeks, I have visited many of the branches in ORR and discussed with the analysts their problems in terms of use of aerial photographs. In all offices the personnel are aware of aerial photographs and photo-interpretation reports. In few were they aware that considerably more information could be derived from the available photography than they had at hand. In many offices, this was demonstrated by sitting down with the analyst and the photographs and combining forces to extract photo-intelligence by uniting data from the photographs and documents that were being used in the study of a particular plant. All seem well aware of the current lacunae caused by the absence of photo-interpreters in CIA alert to the specific needs in ORR.

2. The cry usually is raised that we have no current photography over USSR, and that the photography captured from the Germans is about 10 years old. This is true. However, that 10-year-old photography is an important basic cover that may be used for the starting point of a study on any plant that is not wholly new. The limitations of the terrain and layout of urban areas upon a plant expansion program is clear from these. Combined with evidence of change from interrogations etc., these old photographs allow the development of reasonably accurate and reliable plans of the modified plants. These old photographs, possibly more than 300,000 in number, may be used to check the accuracy

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of POW reports and select from a hundred or so of them those that are most reliable. There is also a psychological effect upon the analyst. Once he has seen a plant in three dimensions under a stereoscope the plant becomes a real entity and is no longer merely a name. His knowledge of the physical plant as it was of a known date assists him in screening information for conformity with the possibilities of the buildings and site.

3. At present there is no effective way for the analysts to utilize the mass of direct evidence present in the available aerial photographs. He does have the photo-interpretations made by various agencies for targeting projects. These are a very poor substitute for what he may have under the proper conditions. They were prepared for use in deciding "bombability". The analyst's task is to judge economic potential. This requires a different point of view on the part of the photo-interpreter. To achieve the maximum economic information from this source it is necessary for the analyst and the photo-interpreter to sit down together and by question-and-answer technique discover the probable function of each building and establish a flow plan for the operations carried out at the plant. Once this is done the critical buildings can be selected and studied to estimate the maximum flow through the "bottle-necks". All of this requires the closest cooperation between analyst and photo-interpreter. Of course the ideal situation would be to have the two persons combined in one!

4. Since it is impossible to train each of the analysts to be a competent photo-interpreter, the next best thing is to have available

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in CIA a small team of adequately equipped skilled industrial photo-interpreters to act with analysts. These should be placed in the organization that their services are available to all parts of CIA. Perhaps the best spot would be Graphics Register since that area is specifically charged with the exploitation of photographic documents. On the other hand, there is dire need for one individual in ORR who is well versed in photo-intelligence to circulate and learn the individual analyst's problems in terms of photo-interpretation. I visualize such a person working in futures to a large extent. Thus the present problem of getting photography to the analysts when needed and not a week later can be overcome. He would plan out the most economic utilization of the photo-interpreters' time, doing actual photo-interpretations himself when possible. Where capable analysts are found he might well instruct them sufficiently to do most of their own interpreting and act as a referee or guide for them when the going gets too rough.

5. To recapitulate: The analysts in ORR are not deriving the full benefit of currently available aerial photography related to their problems; it is not possible for them to get it under existing conditions; there is a current and continuing need for a small number of mobile photo-interpreters that can be called in by individual analysts for skilled cooperation; there is an acute need for a person in ORR who is cognizant of the potentials and limitations of photo-interpretation to assist the analysts in mapping out the photo attack on specific problems.

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6. If administrative conditions exist that prevent CIA from establishing a small group of photo-interpreters within its boundaries, the next best move would be to augment the group at PIS/AF. This could be done by granting funds to PIS/AF or better still by paying the salaries of the additional photo-interpreters with CIA funds. If such a procedure is found necessary, it is all the more important that there be in OPR a photo-interpreter consultant to assist the various analysts in drawing up their photo-interpretation requirements and to sit with them while working the photo-interpretation into their accumulated data. While there are some advantages to this, there are more disadvantages. We gain the use of the PIS/AF facilities but we lose the fundamental advantage of direct cooperation of photo-interpreter and analyst. The reports received from PIS/AF will be interpretations and not intelligence.